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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Art. I, section 15 of 
the Califomia constitution both provide 
that no party can be compelled to give tes-
timony that would incriminate himself. 
The policy behind the constitutional 
provisions is to prevent "the employ-
ment of the legal process to extract from 
the person's own lips an admlssion of his 
guilt, which will thus take the place of 
other evidence ... it exists mainly in order 
to stimulate the prosecution to a full and 
fair search for evidence procurable by 
their own exertionsl and to deter them 
from a lazy and pernicious reliance upon 
the accused's testimony extracted by 
force of law". Wigmore, Evidence, sec-
tion 2263. p. 363. 
This privilege is deemed so funda-
mental to our adversary system that Art. 
I, Section 28(d) of the California Constitu-
tion, the "Truth in Evidence" provision 
of Proposition 8, expressly leaves intact 
the provisions in the evidence code that 
provide for the existence of specified 
privileges. 
II. SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE 
The privilege against self-incrimina-
tionactually includes two separate privi-
leges which have been codified in the 
California Evidence Code. The first is the 
privilege ofthe defendant not to be called 
as a witness in a criminal proceeding. 
Evidence Code Section 930. The second is 
the privilege of any person not to disclose 
any matters which may tend to inaimi-
nate him/herself. Cal. Evidence Code 
Section 940 
A. Documents 
The privilege against self-incrimina-
tion protects not only the compelled dis-
closure of oral testimony but also may 
protect the compelled disclosure of cer-
tain types of documents and other per-
sonal property. Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 
378 U.s. 1. Doe v. United States (1988) 487 
U.S. 201, 209. An individual may refuse 
to tum over certain books or records on 
the basis that the information would tend 
to incriminate him or her. Although the 
contents of any documents which are 
voluntarily made by the defendant may 
not be privileged under the Fifth Amend-
ment, Fisher v. United States (1976) 425 
U.s. 391, the act of production may be 
privileged and protected as incriminat-
ing. Fisher v. United States (1976) 425 
U.S. 391. Counsel may assert a privilege 
and refuse to turn over these documents 
even when the content itself does not fall 
within the privilege. The government 
must then grant immunity as to the act of 
turning over the documents in order to 
compel their disclosure. 
B. CorporatIons 
The privilege against self-incrimina-
tion applies only to natural persons and 
not to corporations, associations or even 
to certain partnerships. The reason that 
the privilege is limited in this way is an 
acknowledgement that corporate organi-
zations are set up under a state charter 
and the state is entitled to examine their 
records to determine if there is any 
wrongdoing. 
In Braswell v. United States (1988) 487 
U.s. 99 a grand jury issued a subpoena to 




rations ordering him to turn over certain 
books and records. Braswell filed. a mo-
tion to quash asserting thatthe act of pro-
duction has testimonial significance 
which would incriminate him person-
ally. The motion was denied and the 
court held that since a corporation has no 
Fifth Amendment privilege a corporate 
officer could not "resist a subpoena on 
the ground that his act of production will 
be personally incriminating". 487 U.s. at 
117. The court recognized that an exten-
sion of the privilege to the records custo-
dians of corporate entities would "have a 
detrimental impact on the government's 
efforts to prosecute "white collar 
crime' ... and authorities would be sty-
mied not only in their enforcement ef-
forts against those individuals but also in 
their prosecutions of organizations. 487 
U.S. at 115-116. 
In Bellis v. United States (1974) 417 
U.S. 85, 945. Ct. 2179,2186 the court held 
that even a small law partnership could 
not claim a privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. The test of whether an entity is 
excluded from asserting a FFifth Amend-
ment privilege is whether it "had an es-
tablished institutional identity indepen-
dent of its individual partners ... and 
represent{s] a formal institutional ar-
rangement organized for the continuing 
conduct olthe firms [business]" 417 U.s. 
at 95. 
C. TestimonJal eYlclence 
The privilege against self-incrimina-
tion protects any witness including the 
defendant, from being compelled to pro-
duce "testimonial" or communicative 
evidence. Schmerber v. California (1966) 
384 U.s. 757. This includes the "accused 
communications, whatever form they 
might take, and the comp\llsion of re-
sponses which are also communications, 
for example, compliance with a sub-
poena to produce one's papers". 384 U.S. 
at 763. The fact that the defendant was 
the source of the real or physical evi-
dence is not, by itself, enough to make the 
evidenoe testimonial. 384 U.s. at 764. The 
matters sought to be protected. must be 
truly "communicative" in nature. 
In Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990) 496 
U.S. ~ 110S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d528, 
the Su preme Court examined several 
aspects of the procedures following an 
arrest of a drunk driver to determine 
which aspects of the tests and questions 
elicited "testimonial" evidence which 
was protected by the Fifth Amendment. 
The defendant, Muniz was arrested for 
driving while under the influence on a 
Pennsylvania highway. Without being 
advised of his rights, he was taken to a 
booking center where the sobriety tests 
and booking procedures were video-
taped. Muniz was not advised of his 
Miranda rights until aiter the booking 
procedure was finished. (This raised the 
issue of whether the statements made by 
Muniz were in violation of Miranda, 
which will not be addressed here). The 
court considered the relationship be-
tween the privilege and various types of 
evidence obtained from the defendant. 
[496 U.s. at 582] 
First the court addressed the defen-
danr s statements in which his speech was 
slurred and held that "any slurring of 
speech and other evidence of lack of mus-
cular coordination revealed by Muniz's 
responses to Officer Hostereman's direct 
questions constitute non-testimonial com-
ponents of those responses. Requiring the 
suspect to reveal the physical manner in 
which he articulates words, like requiring 
him to reveal the physical properties of the 
sound produced by his voice, ... does not, 
without more, compel him to provide a 
'testimonial' response for purposes of the 
privilege. 
Second, the court addressed the con-
tent of the defendant's response to the 
officer's request that he give the date of 
his' sixth birthday. The court held that 
this response was testimonial and in-
criminating not just because of the man-
ner it which it was spoken but because 
the content supported the inference that 
the defendant's mental state was con-
fused. The court stated: 
"The vast majority of verbal state-
ments will be testimonial, because there 
are very few instances in which a verbal 
statement, either oral or written, will not 
convey information or assert facts' 
Whenever a suspect is asked for a re-
sponse requiring him to communicate an 
express or implied belief, the suspects 
confronts the "trilemma' of truth, falsity, 
or silence ... " 110 L.Ed.2d at 549. 
The court then addressed the admis-
sibility of the seven questions asked be-
fore the "birthday" question including 
name, address, height, weight, eyeeolor, 
date of birth and current age. Although 
the court held that this evidence need not 
be excluded, they disagreed on the ratio-
nal. Four justices found that the re-
sponses to these questions were not tes-
timonial in nature and therefore not 
privileged. The other four justices found 
the answers to these questions admis-
sible under the "routine booking excep-
tion" to the Miranda rule. 
Finally, the court examined the ad-
missibility of video and audio tapes of 
the defendant performing a series of so-
briety tests. The court found that these 
did not violate the privilege against self-
incrimination. The court held that the 
police officer's instructions did not call 
for any verbal responses and therefore 
the statements that were made were 
purely voluntary. 
In People v. Lopez (1963) 60 Cal. 2d 
223,32 Cal. Rptr. 424, 384 P. 2d 16, the 
defendant was arrested in connection 
with a series of robberies. He was placed 
in a police show-up and asked to put on 
certain clothing and to speak. The court 
held that there was no violation of the 
defendant's privilege against self-in-
crimination stating: 
"There is no indication, on the record 
before us, that the defendants made or 
were asked to make any statements that 
would tend to incriminate them. The 
privilege [against self-incrimination] ex-
tends only to testimonial compulsion; 
requiring defendants to assume a certain 
pose for purposes of identification, or to 
speak for voice identification is not 
within the privilege ... Even within the 
courtroom during trial a defendant may 
be required to stand and remove a visor 
so that witnesses attempting to identify 
him (or presumptively exonerate him) 
may have an unobstructed view of his 
features." (citations omitted) 60 Cal. 2d 
at 244. 
In People v. Thomas (1986) 180 Cal. 
App.3d 49, 225 Cal. Rptr. 277, the trial 
court ordered the defendants to provide 
pubic arid head hair samples, saliva, and 
blood samples. The defendants claimed a 
violation of their Fifth Amendment 
privilege. The court of Appeals held "the 
self-incrimination privilege inapplicable 
to ... non-testimonial evidence such as fin-
gerprints, blood samples, breath tests, 
appearances in line-ups, and handwrit-
ing and voice exemplars. 180 Cal. App. 
3d at 52 (quoting People v. Collie, (1981) 
30 Cal.3d 43, 55, fn.7, 177 Cal. Rptr.458.) 
Evidence which has been deemed 
non-testimonial and whose production 
may be compelled without violating the 
Fifth Amendment include: fingerprints, 
[Peoplev. Williams (1969) 71 Cal.2d 614]; 
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taking of photographs, [People v. Smith 
(1956) 142 Cal. App.2d 287,293 P.2d 540]; 
taking of handwriting exemplars, [Gil-
bert v. California (1967) 388 U.S. 263, 
267]; Voice identification, [People v. 
Ellis (1966) 65 Cal. 2d 529, 534, 421 P.2d 
393]; taking bodily fluids, [Schmerber v. 
California (1966) 384 U.S. 757. 
However, if the procedures are suffi-
ciently invasive or brutal, counsel may 
object that the taking of the evidence vio-
lates his client's right to due process even 
where no privilege against self-incrimi-
nation may exist. [Rochin v. California 
(1951) 342 U.S. 165, surgical procedures 
violate due process; Winston v. Lee 
(1985) 470 U.S. 753 held that involuntary 
surgery to remove bullet violated due 
process; People v. lanes (1989) 209 Cal. 
App.3d 725, held a police choke as a 
means of preventing the destruction of 
evidence or to force the defendant to dis-
gorge evidence violates due process] 
California drunk driving laws have ~ 
an additional means of securing physical 
evidence from a suspect who has been 
arrested. Since 1966, California has had 
an "Implied Consent Law" which pro-
vides that any person who drives a motor 
vehicle in California is deemed to have 
given his/her consent to chemical testing 
of blood, alcohol, or urine for the pur-
poses of determining the alcoholic or 
drug content. The tests must be given 
incident to a lawful arrest for Vehicle 
Code Section 23152 or 23153. There are 
several consequences for a refusal to take 
the tests. The jury may be advised of the 
fact that the defendant refused to submit 
to these tests and instructed to consider 
that refusal in their deliberations. How-
ever, separate from whatever may hap-
pen in the judicial proceedings, a person 
who refuses to submit to one of these 
tests may have his/her license sus-
pended or revoked in a separate admin-
istrative proceeding. 
m. DEFENDANT'S RIGHT NOT TO BE 
CAu.ED AS A WITNESS 
A. StatutOI')" Authority 
Cal. Evidence Code Section 930 
provides: 
To the extent that such a privilege 
exists under the Constitution of the 
United States or the State of Califor-
nia, a defendant in a criminal case 
has a privilege not to be called as a 
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witness and not to testify. 
The privilege against seU-incrimina-
tion which is conferred on a defendant is 
broader than that of any other witness. 
"While a witness is privileged from an-
swering any question which may be in-
criminating, the accused's right is greater 
- an accused can refuse to be sworn and 
need not wait to determine whether the 
question calls for incriminating testi-
mony. In re: Witherspoon (1984) 162 Cal. 
App.3d 1001,1001,209 Cal. Rptr. 67, 68. 
The defendant's privilege has two 
basic requirements; 1) that the person 
who holds the privilege is a "defendant" 
and 2) that the privilege may only be 
claimed in a criminal proceeding in 
which that defendant is being charged. 
B. Scope of the privllege 
A person has the right not to be called 
as a witness in any criminal proceeding 
in which that person has the status of a 
criminal defendant. Penal Code Section 
16 defines criminal charges as felonies, 
misdemeanors and infractions. Once the 
criminal proceeding has commenced, 
this privilege extends to all phases within 
the case including the preliminary hear-
ing, any and all motions to suppress evi-
dence, the insanity portion of a bifur-
cated trial where the defendant has en-
tered a plea of not guilty by reason of 
insanity, the sentencing phase of a death 
penalty case, and any probation revoca-
tion proceedings. 
However, there are numerous pro-
ceedings which are part of the criminal 
justice system to which the privilege 
against self-incrimination does not ap-
ply. In these cases a person may be re-
quired to appear and to be sworn. Once 
sworn, the individual is now a witness 
and may refuse as a witness to answer 
any questions which may tend to in-
criminate him/her. 
In Re: Lemon (1936) 15 Cal. App.2d 82 
the defendant, Lemon was subpoenaed 
to testify before the grand jury which was 
conducting an investigation into alleged 
corruption in the San Francisco police 
department. Lemon refused to be sworn 
or to testify citing his privilege as a defen-
dant not to testify. Lemon, was a police 
captain in San Francisco and alleged that 
"he was a 'potential defendant' as he was 
one of a class of persons under investiga-
tion". 15 Cal. App. 2d at 83. The trial 
court found Lemon in contempt and 
committed him. This appeal was 
brought as a writ of habeas corpus in 
which Lemon seeks his release. The court 
of appeal rejected Lemon's claim and 
held: 
[that] Lemon "has confused theposi-
tion of one having the status of a wit-
ness in any proceeding, civil or crimi-
nal, with the position of one having 
the status of a party defendant in a 
criminal proceeding brought against 
such defendanLA grand jury inves-
tigation is in no proper sense a crimi-
nal proceeding and no person has the 
status of a party defendant in such in-
vestigation which is held merely for 
the purpose of determining whether 
any criminal proceeding shall be 
commenced". 15 Cal. app.2d at 84-
85. 
The court concluded that 
Every person may be compelled to 
attend and be sworn before the 
grand jury. It is [their] duty to an-
swer all proper questions 
address ... unless and until the an-
swer to a particular question would 
tend to incriminate him. Then, and 
then only, does his constitutional 
privilege intervene and furnish him 
with a shield against self-disclosure. 
15 Cal. App.2d at 91. 
In Killpatrick v. Superior Court (1957) 
153 Cal. App.2d 146,314 P.2d 164, the 
court held that the defendant's privilege 
not to testify applies during contempt 
proceedings. Killpatrick was charged 
with contempt for wilful failure to pay 
support for his wife and children. At the 
contempt hearing, Killpatrick had no 
counsel and the prosecutor called him to 
testify as a witness. During the hearing 
both the prosecutor and the judge ques-
tioned Killpatrick about his actions. The 
court of appeal granted the petition for 
certiorari and held: 
"Contempt of court is a public of-
fense, and by section 166 ofthe Penal 
Code is expressly declared to consti-
tutea misdemeanor ... the procedure 
for the investigation of the charge is 
analogous to the criminal procedure 
and the judgement against the per-
son guilty of the offense is visited 
with a fine, or imprisonment, or 






The court reasoned that even if the 
contempt arises from a civil actioh, "the 
proceeding to punish them for such mis-
conduct is no part of the process in the 
civil action, but is in the nature of a crimi-
nal prosecution. Killpatrick at 149. 
In Re Withspoon (]984) 162 Cal. 
App.3d 1001, 209 Cal. Rptr. 67, the defen-
dant was charged with willful failure to 
pay court ordered child support. The 
trial court, over defense objection, al-
lowed wife's counsel to call the defen-
dant, have him sworn and to answer 
questions on the "limited issue" of the 
use of a community property asset. On 
appeal, the habeas writ was granted for 
the defendant and the court held that" an 
alleged contemnor has an absolute right 
to refuse to appear as a witness in the 
proceedings" and is not limited only to 
the privilege to refuse to answer incrimi-
nating questions. 162 Cal. App3d atl002. 
In Black v. State Bar Association 
(] 972) 7 Cal.3d 676 the court held that an 
attorney could not refuse to be sworn as 
a witness but had only the more limited 
privilege of refusing to answer any ques-
tions which would tend to incriminate 
him/her. In this case, the court found 
that any privilege was waived since no 
objection was made at the time of the 
hearing. 
In People v. Whelchel (]967) 255 Cal. 
App. 2d 455, 63 Cal. Rptr. 258 the court 
held that hearings under the Welfare and 
Institutions Code Section 350 are civil in 
nature and not criminal. These hearings 
allow the court to commit to a rehabilita-
tion program persons convicted of cer-
tain drug offenses and deemed to be ad-
dicted or in inuninent danger of becom-
ing addicted. The court reasoned that the 
confinement incident to the rehabilita-
tion program, although involuntary, is 
not a penal sanction. 255 Cal. App. 2d 
460-461. Since these were not criminal 
proceedings, the defendants could not 
refuse to be sworn and testify, but could 
only refuse to answer those questions 
which would tend to incriminate them. 
255 Cal. App. 2d at 461. at 263. 
C. "Griffin" elTOr 
It is improper for any party to com-
ment upon the defendant's exercise of 
his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. 
Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609. 
That rule is also set forth in Cal. Evidence 
Code Section 913. H.owever, this rule 
does not foreclose the prosecutor from 
arguing the absence of other evidence to 
rebut the governments case nor does it 
preclude any comment by the prosecutor 
on the defendanY s failure to call a logical, 
material witness. What is necessary, 
however, is that the source of the miss-
ing evidence is someone or something 
other than the defendant. 
In Griffin v. California (1965)380 U.s. 
609 the defendant was convicted of first 
degree murder in a California court. On 
appeal the defendant alleged error upon 
the fact that the prosecutor commented 
to the jury in his closing argument that 
the defendant failed to explain and deny 
certain matters. The United States Su-
preme Court held that the comments on 
a defendants refusal to testify violated 
the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States constitution and "it cuts down on 
the privilege by making its assertion 
costly". 380 U.S. at 614. The court held: 
We: .. hold that the Fifth Amend-
ment, in its direct application to the 
Federal government, and in its bear-
ing on the States by reason of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, forbids ei-
ther comment by the prosecution on 
the accused's silence or instructions 
by the court that such silence is evi-
dence of guilt. 380 U.S. at 615. 
In People v. Ford (]988) 45 Cal. 3d 431, 
247 Cal. Rptr. 121,754 P.2d 168 the defen-
dant was on trial for burglary. Two of his 
alleged accomplices had already been 
convicted pursuant to pleas of guilty and 
the third accomplice was awaiting trial. 
The defendant testified and placed him-
self with the alleged co-defendants at the 
time of the burglaries at a different loca-
tion. In closing argument the prosecutor 
argued to the jury that if the defendanYs 
testimony was true, then the other per-
sons should have been brought in to tes-
tify. The defense argued that the co-de-
fendants were not called to testify since 
they all had a valid privilege against self-
incrimination and would refuse to tes-
tify. The court rejected this explanation 
holding that a witness must be called, 
sworn, and refuse to answer questions 
put to him before a valid privilege is 
found. The court found the prosecutor's 
argument proper and not a violation of 
Griffin holding that "comment on a 
defendant's failure to call a logical wit-
ness in no way undercuts the privilege 
against self-incrimination". 45 Cal. 3d at 
447. However, the court noted that there 
may be limitations on a when a prosecu-
tor may argue these inferences stating: 
[A] rule permitting comment on a 
defendant's failure to call witnesses is 
subject to criticism if applied when the 
reason for his failure to do so is ambigu-
ous or if the defendant is simply standing 
on his right to have the state prove his 
guilt. Therefore, the trial court must have 
discretion to determine when the cir-
cumstances of the case are such that com-
ment is not permissible. 45 Cal.3d at 447. 
In People v. Chandler (1971) 17 
Cal.App.3d 801, 95 Cal.Rptr. 146 the de-
fendant offered no evidence to rebut the 
facts presented by the government. In 
closing, the prosecutor posed a series of 
rhetorical questions which suggested 
that the defendant should have been able 
to produce an alibi if he were, in fact, not 
guilty of the crimes. The court held that 
these comments were not improper in 
that "Griffin" did not foreclose the pros-
ecutor from emphasizing the absence of 
other evidence to controvert the proof in 
the People's case. Griffin does not bar a 
suggestion by counsel "that a failure to 
produce certain witnesses or evidence, 
other than [the defendant's] own testi-
mony, ... warrants an inference that the 
witnesses or evidence were either non-
existent or unfavorable to the defen-
dant." 17 Cal.App.3d at 806. 
Although the prosecutor may not 
comment on the defendant's failure to 
testify, once the defendant takes the 
stand and testifies, the prosecution may 
comment to the jury on his/her failure to 
explain or deny any matters which are at 
issue in the case and argue the implausi-
bility of the testimony. The prosecutor 
may also request the court to instruct the 
jury to consider these failures by the de-
fendant. 
D. Waiver of the privilege 
The defendant who takes the stand 
and testifies on direct examination 
waives his/her privilege not to testify 
and now subjects him/herself to the 
myriad of consequences which follow. 
The defendant is now subject to a full 
cross examination by both the prosecu-
tion as well as by lawyers for any code-
fendant. The scope of permissible cross 
examination may include any matters 
which were raised either directly or by 
implication on direct examination as 
well as any and all permiSSible impeach-
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ment. People v. Almanza (1981) 173 Cal. 
Rptr. 822. This could include impeach-
ment with the defendant's prior convic-
tions (Evidence Code Section 788) or im-
peachment of his/her character (Evi-
dence Code Section 1101). However, a 
defendant may not be cross examined 
about any earlier assertion of his/her 
privilege not to testify either at an earller 
proceeding or trial. People v. Sharer 
(1964) 61 Cal. 2d 869, 40 Cal. Rptr. 851, 
395 P.2d 899. (The court held it was error 
for the prosecutor to cross examine the 
defendant at trial about the fact that he 
refused to testify at the grand jury based 
upon his Fifth Amendment privilege). 
In People v.l!J.<: (1967) 65 Cal.2d 603, 
55 Cal. Rptr. 902, 422 P.2d 590, the defen-
dant was a doctor who was charged with 
raping a female patient. He allegedly 
administered an anesthetic to her to pre-
vent her from resisting. At trial, Dr. Ing 
testified on his own behalf. The govern-
ment proceeded on cross examination to 
ask the doctor about several other of-
fenses for which he was not yet charged, 
in order to show a common scheme or 
plan. The court held that this cross ex-
amination was proper, emphasizing that 
"where a defendant takes the stand and 
makes a general denial of the crime the 
permissible scope of cross examination is 
very wide". 65 Cal. 2d at 611. 
In People v. lames (1976) 56 
Cal.App.3d 876, 128 Cal. Rptr. 733 the 
defendant was charged with burglary 
and testified in his own behalf to an alibi. 
On cross-examination the prosecutor 
questioned the defendant about the fact 
that he left the state for several months 
after he had knowledge that he was a 
suspect in the case and, in fact, was ar-
rested in another state. The court ob-
served that" A defendant in a criminal 
case ... may not be examined ... beyond the 
scope of the direct examination ... [as this] 
would amount to forcing such defendant 
to become the prosecution's witness. 56 
Cal. App.3d at 887. However, the court 
held that since the defendant's alibi con-
stituted an lmplied denial of guilt and the 
question of flight is relevant to the issue 
of guilt, the cross examination was per-
missible. 
In People v. Kaddison (1966) 243 
CaI.App.2d 162, 167, 52 Cal. Rptr. 114, the 
defendant was charged with possession 
of marijuana. During his trial he took the 
stand and testified that he was familiar 
with marijuana from his studies at the 
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college. On cross examination the pros-
ecutor asked the defendant: "You know 
about marijuana because you have 
smoked marijuana, isn't that true?". 243 
Cal. App. 2d at 167. The defendant re-
fused to answer the question and as-
serted his Fifth Amendment privilege. 
The prosecutor moved to strike the 
defendant's testimony and the court 
granted this motion. On appeal, the de-
fendant did not challenge the trial court's 
striking of the defendant's testimony. 
The only issue raised was whether the 
question asked by the prosecutor was 
properly within the scope of cross exami-
nation. The court of appeal ruled that the 
question was proper as the prosecutor 
was entitled to show that the defendant's 
knowledge about marijuana was from 
his prior usage and not his studies. The 
court indicated that the test for the per-
missible scope of cross examination was 
set out in Brown v. United States, 356 u.s. 
148 and quoted from that opinion: 
[W]hen a witness voluntarily testi-
fies, the privilege against self-in-
crimination is amply respected 
without need of accepting testi-
mony freed from the antiseptic test 
of the adversary process. The wit-
ness himself, certainly if he is a 
party, determines the area of disclo-
sure and therefore of inquiry. Such a 
witness has the choice, after weigh-
ing the advantage of the privilege 
against self-incrimination against 
the advantage of putting forward 
his version of the facts and his reli-
ability as a witness, not to testify at 
all. He cannot reasonably claim that 
the Fifth Amendment gives him not 
only this choice, but, if he elects to 
testify, an immunity from cross ex-
amination on the matters he himself 
has put in dispute. 
'" 
The test for admissibility is: Does it 
tend logically, naturally and by reason-
able inference, to establish any fact mate-
rial for the people, or to overcome any 
material matter sought to be proved by 
the defense? If it does, then it is admis-
sible, whether it embraces the commis-
sion of another crime or does not, 
whether the other crime be similar in 
kind or not, whether it be part of a single 
design or not. 243 Cal. App. 2d at 168. 
In People v. Glidden (1989) 258 Cal. 
Rptr. 463 the court addressed the issue of 
whether once a defendant testifies, he/ 
she could be cross examined about his 
post arrest silence. The court observed 
that "[e]vidence of past-arrest silence is 
so lacking in probative value and so 
fraught with the risks of prejudice and 
undue consumption of time it should 
rarely, if ever, be permitted. However, in 
this case trial counsel's failure to object 
during trial defeated the issue on appeal. 
In Peoplev. Sharer (1964) 61 Cal. 2d 869, 
40 Cal. Rptr. 851 the prosecutor cross ex-
amined the defendant during the trial 
with the defendant's refusal to testify 
before the grand jury and the fact that the 
defendant asserted his privilege against 
self-incrimination as the basis for his re-
fusal. The court held that this was revers-
ible error The court rejected the govern-
ments argument that this evidence was 
being offered solely as impeachment of 
the defendant's trial testimony and held 
that "it became impossible for the jury to 
separate the 'impeaching nature of the 
evidence from the inference that defen-
dant refused to answer because he was 
guilty". 61 Cal.2d at 877. 
E. 11Ie "Single Proceeding" Rule 
The privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is different than most other privi-
leges in that any waiver is effective only 
in the proceeding in which the defendant 
testifies. People v. Lopez (1980) 110 Cal. 
App.3d 1010, 168 Cal. Rptr. 378. This has 
been termed the "Single Proceeding 
Rule". 
In most circumstances the testimony 
of the defendant may be used at his/her 
trial by the government as an admission 
of the defendant. Therefore, if a defen-
dant testifies at a preliminary hearing in 
connection with his/her case, the defen-
dant may not be called as a witness dur-
ing his/her trial in that case. The pros-
ecutors ability to use those statements as 
admissions during trial depend on the 
nature of the proceeding at which the 
testimony was given. 
In Simmons v. United States (1968) 
390 U.S. 377 the defendant gave incrimi-
nating testimony at a fourth amendment 
suppression motion. At trial, the govern-
ment used his testimony on the issue of 
guilt. The Supreme Court reversed and 
held that the government was prohibited 
from using this testimony or the defen-






what he believed, with advice of counsel. 
to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim 
or ... waive his Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination". 390 U.S. 
at 394. The court found it "intolerable 
that one constitutional right should have 
to be surrendered in order to assert an-
other" . 390 U.S. at 394. 
In Peoplev. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 
867,120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024, the 
court would not allow the testimony of 
the defendant at a probation revocation 
hearing to be used at his trial except for 
impeachment or rebuttal. The court held 
that to force an individual to choose be-
tween "the cruel trilemma of self-accusa-
tion, perjury or injurious silence ... runs 
counter to our historic aversion to cruelty 
reflected in the privilege against self-in-
crimination. 13 Cal. 3d at 878. However, 
the court held that this protection would 
apply only at the final revocation hearing 
and not to any testimony given at pre-
liminary proceedings in that matter. 
IV. WITNESS AND DEFENDANT'S 
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SElJ' 
INCRIMINATION 
A .• Statutory Authority 
Cal. Evidence Code Section 940 pro-
vides: 
To the extent that such privilege ex-
ists under the Constitution of the 
United States or the State of CaIilor-
nia, a person has a privilege to 
refuse to disclose any matter that 
may tend to incriminate him. 
B. Rationale 
The rationale for the privilege against 
self-incrimination was set out at length in 
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission 
(1964) 378 U.S. 52, 55 where the Supreme 
Court stated: 
The privilege against self-incrimina-
tion ... reflects many of our funda-
mental values and most noble aspi-
rations; our unwillingness to subject 
those suspected of crime to the cruel 
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury 
or contempt; our preference for an 
accusatorial rather than an inquisi-
torial system of criminal justice; our 
fear that self-incriminating state-
ments will be elicited by inhumane 
treatment and abuses .. our sense of 
fair play wIDch dictates "a fair state-
individual balance by requiring the 
government to leave the individual 
alone until good cause is sho'WIl for 
disturbing him and by requiring the 
government in its contest with the 
individual to shoulder the entire 
load; our respect for the inviolability 
of the human personality and the 
right of each individual 'to a private 
enclave where he may lead a private 
life' ... ; our distrust of self-depreca-
tory statements; and our realization 
that the privilege, wIDle sometimes 
'a shelter to the guilty: is often 'a 
protection to the innocent." 
c. Scope of the PJ1vllage 
Any person .. may assert a privilege 
not to disclose incriminating evidence in 
either a civil or a criminal proceeding. 
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of 
New York Harbor, (1964) 378 U.S. 52, The 
coultin People v. Lamey (1930) 103 Cal. 
App.66, discussed the scope of this privi-
lege stating: 
To bring a person within the immu-
nity of this provision [section 13 of 
article I of the California constitu-
tion], it is not necessary that the ex-
amination of the witness should be 
had in the course of a criminal pros-
ecution against him, or that a crimi-
nal proceeding should be pending. 
It is sufficient if there is a law creat-
ing the offense underwIDch thewit-
ness may be prosecuted. If there is 
such a law,and if the witness may be 
indicted or otherwise prosecuted for 
a public offense arising out of the 
acts to which the examination re-
lates, he cannot be compelled to an-
swer in any collateral proceeding. 
civil or criminaL unless the law has 
absolutely secured him against any 
use in a criminal prosecution of the 
evidence he may give; and this can 
only be done by a statutory provi-
sion that, if he submits to the exami-
nation and answers the questions, 
he shall be exempt from criminal 
prosecution for any offense that 
may be disclosed as a consequence 
of IDS examination. 103 Cal. App. at 
69, quoting In re Tahbel, 46 
CaI.App.755,758. 
D. Burden of Proof 
Evidence Code Section 404 sets forth 
the burden of proof as follows: 
Whenever the proffered evidence is 
claimed to be privileged under Section 
940, the person claiming the privilege has 
the burden of showing that the preferred 
evidence might tend to incriminate him; 
and the preferred evidence is inadmis-
sible unless it clearly appears to the court 
that the preferred evidence cannot possi-
bly have a tendency to incriminate the 
person claiming the privilege. 
The court, in deciding on the whether 
the witness holds a valid privilege must 
consider "matters disclosed in argument, 
the implications of the question, the set-
ting in wIDch it is asked, the applicable 
statute of limitations and all other rel-
evant factors. Law Revision Commission 
-Comment to Evid. Code Section 404. 
However, the burden is on the party as-
serting the privilege to present tIDS infor-
mation to the court. 
In Hoffman v. United States (1951) 
341 U.S. 479 the Supreme Court dis-
cussed the application of the privilege 
against self-incrimination as follows: 
"The privilege afforded not only ex-
tends to answers that would, in 
themselves, support a conviction 
under a federal criminal statute but 
likewise embraces those which 
would furnish a link in the chain of 
evidence needed to prosecute the 
claimant for a federal crime ... but 
this protection must be confined to 
instances where the witness has rea-
sonable cause to apprehend danger 
from a direct answer .. . The witness is 
not exonerated for answering 
merely because he declares that in 
so doing he would incriminate him-
self - his say-so does not of itself es-
tablish the hazard of incrimination. 
It is for the court to say whether IDS 
silence is justified ... and to require 
him to answer if 'it clearly appears 
to the court that he is mistaken' '" To 
sustain the privilege, it need only be 
evident from the implication of the 
question in the setting in which it is 
asked that a responsive answer to 
the question or an explanation of 
why it cannot be answered might be 
dangerous because injurious disclo-
sure could result. [citationsomitted] 
341 U.S. at 486-487. [emphasis 
added] 
In People v. Whelchel (1967) 255 Cal. 
App, 2d 455, 63 Cal. Rptr. 258 the defen-
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dant was called to testify at a hearing to 
determine whether he should be com-
mitted for rehabilitation as an addict. The 
court held that the person who is the suI>-
ject of these proceedings had no right to 
refuse to testify [see section 41.21[2] 
above] but could, once called, refuse to 
answer questions which would be in-
criminating. The court discussed the 
standard by which the self-incrimination 
provision would apply: 
To bring a person witltin the immu-
nity of[Art.!, sec. 13 oftheCalifornia 
Constitution}, it is not necessary that 
the examination should be at-
tempted in a criminal prosecution 
against the witness, or that such a 
prosecution should have been com-
menced and actually pending. It is 
sufficient if there is a law under 
which the witness may be indicted 
or otherwise prosecuted for a public 
offense arising out of the acts to 
which the examination relates, he 
cannot be compelled to answer in 
any collateral proceeding, unless the 
law absolutely secures him against 
any use in a criminal prosecution of 
the evidence he may give. 255 Cal. 
App. 2d at 462. 
E. Documents 
The general principle with respect to 
the Fifth Amendments application to a 
persons papers was set out by Justice 
Holmes in Tohnson v. United States, 
(1913) 228 U.S. 457, 458 where he stated: 
A party is privileged from producing 
the evidence but not from its produc-
tion". Under this premise, documents, 
records, or other writings which are law-
fully seized from the defendant, or any 
other witness, may be introduced at trial 
against him without implicating any 
Fifth Amendment privilege. The Fifth 
Amendment "does not independently 
proscribe the compelled production of 
every sort of incriminating evidence but 
applies only when the accused is com-
pelled to make a testimonial communica-
tion that is incriminating. Fisher v. 
United States (1976) 425 U.S. 391, 408. 
"Where the preparation of business 
records is voluntary, no compulsion is 
present. United States v. Doe (1984) 465 
U.S. 605, 610. 
However, although the contents of a 
document may not be privileged, the act 
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of producing the document maybe. "The 
act of producing evidence in response to 
a subpoena ... has communicative as-
pects of its own, wholly aside from the 
contents of the papers produced. Com-
pliance with the subpoena tacitly con-
cedes the existence of the papers de-
manded and their possession or control 
by the [person]. It would also indicate the 
[individual's] belief that the papers are 
those described in the subpoena". Fisher 
v. United States (1975) 425 U.S. at 410. In 
a case where the government seeks pro-
duction of documents or records from a 
person (by way of subpoena or other le-
gal process) the goverrunentmay need to 
confer "production immunity" ,that is, 
immunity that goes to the act of the pro-
duction itself, in order to compel the pro-
duction. This does not grant immunity as 
to the contents of the documents, but 
merely states that the act of production 
may not be used against the witness in 
any proceeding. 
In Fisher v. United States (1976) 425 
U.s. 391 the government sought from an 
accountant the productionofa taxpayers 
documents relating to the preparation of 
their tax return. The court held that these 
documents must be produced and in-
volved no violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege of the taxpayers. The 
court first cited that the compulsion here 
was against the accountant and not 
against the taxpayers and that "since it is 
extortion of information from the ac-
cused himself that offends our sense of 
justice ... [here]nothing is being extorted 
from him. 425 u.s. at 398. Citing Couch v. 
United States (1973) 409 U.s. 322, 328. 
The court found no Fifth Amendment 
privilege explaining: 
"[T]he Fifth Amendment would 
not be violated by the fact alone that 
the papers on their face might in-
criminate the taxpayer, for the privi-
lege protects a person only against 
being incriminated by his own com-
pelled testimonial 
communications ... The accountants 
work papers are not the taxpayers. 
They were not prepared by the tax-
payers and they contain no testimo-
nial declarations by him. 
Furthermore, ... the preparation of all 
the papers sought in this case was 
wholly voluntary, and they cannot 
be said to contain compelled testi-
monial evidence either of the tax-
payers or of anyone else. 425 U.S. at 
409-410. 
In Andreson v. Ma'Yland (1976) 427 
U.S. 463 the fraud unit of the State 
Attorney's office seized a number of 
documents from the defendants includ-
ing a number of incriminating docu-
ments some of which contained state-
ments of the defendant. The Supreme 
Court held that no Fifth Amendment 
privilege was offended by the introduc-
tion of these documents into evidence. 
The court observed: 
In this case, [the defendant] was not 
asked to say or to do anything. The 
records seized contained statements 
that [the defendantl had voluntarily 
committed to writing. The search for 
and seizure of these records were 
conducted by law enforcement per-
sonnel. Finally, when these records 
were introduced at trial, they were 
authenticated by a handwriting ex-
pert and not by [the defendant]. Any 
compulsion of [defendant] to speak, 
other than the inherent psychologi-
cal pressure to respond at trial to un-
favorable evidence was not present. 
427 U.S. at 473. 
In United States v. Doe (1984)465 U.S. 
605, the court discussed the Fifth 
Amendment privilege that may arise in 
the act of production of certain docu-
ments. In Doe, the District Court had 
found that the act of producing the docu-
ments would involve testimonial self-
incrimination and had stated: "with few 
exceptions enforcement of the sub-
poena's would compel [defendant] to 
admit that the records exist, that they are 
in his possession, and that they are au-
thentic. These communications if made 
under compulsion of a court decree, 
would violate [defendant's] Fifth 
Amendment rights. 465 U.S. at 613. 1n.11. 
The Supreme Court observed that the 
government could use the documents at 
trial against the defendant upon a grant 
of immunity as to the production of the 
documents. The court observed, that this 
grant of immunity "extends only to the 
actofproduction ... and need only protect 
[defendant] from the self-incrimination 
that might accompany the act of produc-
ing his business records". 465 U.S. at 617 
1n.l7. 
F. Testimony In prior proceedings 
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pressured to testify in conformance with 
her earlier statements to the police or her 
preliminary hearing testimony. TheCali-
fornia Supreme Court disagreed and 
held: 
Nothing in Tillery's plea bargain re-
sembles the evils inherent in the im-
munity agreements condemned in 
those [other] cases. Nothing in the 
record suggests Tillery was ever 
told or led to believe that the benefits 
of her plea bargain would remain in 
force only if she testified in confor-
mity with her statements to the po-
lice or her preliminary hearing testi-
mony. 47 Cal. 3d at 239. 
In People v. Brunner (1973) 32 Cal. 
App.3d908, 108 Cal. Rptr. 501, the court 
described the two distinct factual situa-
tions in which the statute applies: 
The first arises when a witness, not 
himself is within the target area of 
the pending investigation or pros-
ecution refuses to testify or produce 
evidence on the ground of possible 
incrimination .... The grant of immu-
nity to a reluctant witness located 
outside of the target area of the in-
quiry follows a relatively straight-
forward course and may be effected 
by a relatively simple procedure. 
The statute also applies to the pro-
spective witness who himself is situated 
within the target area of the pending in-
vestigation or prosecution. Typically, 
this witness is a party to a multiparty 
crime, but his conduct is considered less 
culpable than that of others involved, 
and his testimony is believed necessary 
for the successful prosecution of his fel-
low wrongdoers. Under these circum-
stances, the prosecutor may be willing to 
promise immunity to the lesser offender 
in order to secure testimony with which 
to pursue the greater offenders ... " 32 Cal. 
App. 3d at 912-913. 
C. Enforcing the Immunity agreement 
Since the immunity agreement is usu-
ally based upon certain agreements and 
promises made by both sides, eruorce-
ment of this agreement may become an 
issue. 
In People v. Brunner (1973) 32 Cal. 
App.3d 908, 108 Cal. Rptr. 501 the people 
appealed a court order dismissing the 
indictment and restraining further pros-
ecution. The government claimed that 
the defendant had failed to comply fully 
with the immunity agreement and there-
fore they were free to prosecute her. The 
court of appeals disagreed and upheld 
the dismissal. The defendant in this case 
testified at an accomplice's murder trial, 
filed an affidavit recanting her testimony 
and later recanting her affidavit. She then 
testified at another accomplice's trial and 
denied participation in the murder. In 
this case the government impeached her 
with her testimony from the first trial. 
Immunity in this case was not granted 
under PC 1324, but rather was the result 
of an agreement between the prosecutor 
and the defendant. However, the court 
held that the agreement was properly 
enforceable. The court observed that 
"enough of the bargain was kept to make 
it operative". 32 Cal. App.3d at 916. The 
court observed two dangers involved in 
negotiating and carrying out immunity 
agreements with witnesses who are also 
targets: 
1) that the witness "does not testify in 
the manner he said he would or refuses 
to testify beyond a certain point, and 
2) that a witness "may be so influ-
enced by his hopes and fears that he will 
promise to testify to anything desired by 
the prosecution in order to obtain a grant 
of immunity" .32 Cal. App. 3d. at 913-
914. 
In light of these dangers the court 
highlighted the desirability of court ap-
proval for immunity agreements and 
suggested that the promises and terms of 
immunity be spelled out clearly in the 
record. 
If the defendant in a case does receive 
immunity under an agreement outside 
of Penal Code section 1324 it is still en-
forceable against the government. How-
ever, if the immunity granted is "use" 
immunity instead of "transactional" im-
munity, the goverrunent may still pros-
ecute the defendant so long as the evi-
dence used at the trial does not include 
the defendant's earlier testimony nor any 
fruits derived therefrom. In Kastigar v. 
United States (1972) 406 U.S. 441, the 
Supreme Court held that "the burden of 
proof .. .is not limited to a negation of the 
taint [of the earlier compelled testi-
mony]; rather, it imposes on the prosecu-
tion the affirmative duty to prove that the 
evidence it proposes to use is derived 
from a legitimate source wholly inde-
pendent of the compelled testimony". 
406 U.S. at 460. 
The defense has a right to reject any 
informal grant of immunity by the gov-
ernment and may insist upon full statu-
tory immunity before the court will com-
pel his/her testimony. However, any in-
fonnal immunity agreement may be en-
forceable once the court finds that the 
parties have relied and acted upon it. 
D. "u .. " Y. "Transactional" Immunity 
While Federal law affords "use" im-
munity, California has adopted "transac-
tional" immunity. Transactional immu-
nity bars prosecution for the disclosed 
substantive offense or the use of the tes-
timony in a criminal prosecution against 
the witness who was compelled to tes-
tify. The witness may be prosecuted for 
perjury, false swearing or contempt for 
failing to answer any questions or in fail-
ing to produce any documents in accor-
dance with a court order to do so. Trans-
actional immunity is broader than "use" 
immunity. 
Under a grant of "use" immunity the 
prosecution is barred from using the 
compelled testimony in subsequent 
criminal proceedings or from using any 
evidence derived from the compelled 
testimony. The prosecution may still 
charge the substantive offense about 
which the witness testified, ifthey can do 
so using evidence which was derived 
independently of the compelled testi-
mony. 
In People v. Campbell (1982) 137 Cal. 
App.3d 867, 187 Cal. Rptr. 340 a defen-
dant was granted immunity to testify at 
a trial. Later the defendant was convicted 
of the same narcotic offenses, although 
the government did not use his earlier 
testimony. The court reversed holding 
that the trial judge had no authority "to 
judicially substitute the constitutionally 
permissible 'use' immunity for section 
1324's express grant of transactional im-
munity". 137 Cal.App.3d at 876. 
The Federal Statute which grants im-
munity is 18 U.S.c. 2514 and provides a 
grant of "use" immunity to an indi-
vidual. However, the immunity which is 
granted to a federal witness must protect 
him against state self-incrimination as 
well. Murphyv. Waterfront Commission 
(1964) 378 U.S. 52. This may not preclude 
all state prosecutions, however, so coun-
sel should be cautioned to carefully ex-
amine the scope of immunity which the 
2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994 
CALIFORNIA DEFENDER 
individual has received. The law is well 
settled that the grant of immunity is a 
replacement for the constitutional privi-
lege of self-incrimination, the immunity 
must be as broad in scope as the privilege 
it replaces. People v. Lawrence (1972) 25 
Cal. App.3d 498, 508, 102 Cal. Rptr. 16. 
Therefore, the state may proceed in a 
prosecution against the defendant if the 
charges are outside the scope of his ear-
lier testimony. In People v. Lawrence. 
(1972) 25 Cal. App.3d 498,102 Cal. Rptr. 
16, the court allowed a state prosecution 
of a defendant on charges bf conspiracy 
to commit murder of the pilot of the drug 
smuggling ring where the defendant had 
previously been a witness in a federal 
trial against the head of the same drug 
smuggling ring for incidents arising un-
til March, 1968. The court held that the 
immunity did not extend to the con-
spiracy to commit murder charge which 
occurred after the pilot "double-
crossed"the organization in June, 1968.' 
E. Defense Request of Immunity for a 
Witness 
The defendanr s fundamental right to 
present witnesses can conflict with a wit-
nesses right to invoke the constitutional 
privilege against self-incrimination. A 
witness asserting the privilege against 
self-incrimination can withhold mate-
rial, relevant and reliable exculpating 
evidence from the trier of fact. Because 
the defendant's right to present wit-
nesses may be rendered meaningless 
when a defense witness invokes this 
privilege and refuses to testify, the defen-
dant may request the prosecution and 
the court to grant immunity from pros-
ecution to the witness in exchange for the 
witness' testimony. When a witness is 
granted immunity in exchange for testi-
mony, the witness can then be compelled 
to testify, under the threat of contempt 
sanctions. 
The language of Penal Code section 
1324 specifically authorizes only the dis-
trict attorney to apply for a grant of im-
munity for those witnesses from whom 
hel she wishes to compel testimony but 
who have a valid privilege against self-
incrimination. There is no mention in the 
statute for the defense to secure the same 
procedures with witnesses whom they 
wish to compel to testify. However, the 
defense should raise these claims under 
the constitutional right to due process 
and a fair trial. 
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In People v. Sutter (1982) 134 Cal. 
App.3d. 806, 184 Cal. Rptr. 829 the de-
fense made a motion at trial that the court 
grant a certain witness immunity so that 
he could testify at trial. The court denied 
the request. On appeal, the defense 
claimed that the court erred in not grant-
ing the witness judicial immunity. On 
appeal, the court held that this issue had 
been waived as the motion at trial related 
specifically to immunity under PS 1324. 
The court noted that the trial court did 
not err in denying the motion under the 
statute as PC 1324 gives the prosecutor 
sole discretion to confer immunity. 134 
Cal. App.3d at 812. However, the court 
went on to observe, in dicta that they 
were persuaded against a doctrine of ju-
dicially declared use immunity that "no 
United States Supreme Court decision 
has construed the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments to grant the trial court the 
power to confer judicially declared use 
immunity to a witness called by the de-
fense". 134 Cal. App.3d 815. 
In People v. Williams (1970) II Cal. 
App.3d 1156, 90 Cal. Rptr. 409 the court 
refused to grant immunity to a defense 
witness who was allegedly an accom-
plice to the crimes. On appeal, the court 
held that there was no due process viola-
tion by the court's refusal to grant immu-
nity. The court recognized that the pros-
ecutor has the right "to select the code-
fendant or coconspirator to whom im-
munity shall be given. II Cal. App.3d 
at 1164. The court observed that "when 
self-incriminating evidence is extracted 
under the mandatory compuls ions of 
that code section such a person cannot 
then be prosecuted for the offense con-
cerning which he gave evidence against 
himself. 11 Cal. App3d 1164. 
In People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 
587,264 Cal. Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608 the 
defendant was charged with the mur-
ders of his father and step-mother. At 
trial, he requested the trial court to grant 
judicial use immunity to his girlfriend so 
that she could testify as to certain state-
ments of the defendant on the day of the 
murder which would show his "state of 
mind" on that day. The girlfriend had a 
valid privilege as she was awaiting trial 
on charges of an accessory after the fact 
of the same murders. The trial court de-
clined to grant the immunity and the 
California Supreme court affirmed. The 
court observed that the PC 1324 provides 
for the granting of transac~onal immu-
nity upon the written request of the pros-
ecutor. 49 Cal. 3d at 973. While the court 
observed that "the Court of Appeals of 
[California] have uniformly rejected the 
notion that a trial court has the inherent 
power, in such circumstances, to coruer 
use immunity upon a witness called by 
the defense" 49 Cal.3d at 973. It went on 
to note that "it is possible to hypothesize 
cases where a judicially conferred use 
immunity might possibly be necessary to 
vindicate a criminal defendanrs right to 
compulsory process and a fair trial. 49 
Cal.3d at 974. 
The only case to confer such a grant of 
immunity at the request of the defendant 
is Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith 
(1980) (3d Cir.) 615 F.2d 964 in which the 
court set Qut the standard by which it 
was applied in stating: 
The opportunities for judicial use of 
this immunity power must be 
clearly limited; ... the proffered testi-
mony must be clearly exculpatory; 
the testimony must be essential; and 
there must be no strong government 
interest which countervails against 
a grant of immunity ... The defendant 
must make a convincing showing 
sufficient to satisfy the court that the 
testimony which will be forthcom-
ing is both clearly exculpatory and 
essential to the defendant's case. 
Immunity will be denied ifthe prof-
fered testimony is found to be am-
biguous, not clearly exculpatory, 
cumulative or it is found to relate 
only to the credibility of the 
government's witness. 615 F.2d at 
972. 
The court in Hunter found that the 
defendant's offer of proof in that case fell 
far short of the test set forth in Smith. 
E. Procedure for Requeat and Grant of 
Immunity 
A request for immunity for a defense 
witness can be made when, after having 
been questioned in a criminal proceed-
ing, a witness refuses to answer on the 
ground that to do so would be poten-
tially incriminating. Upon the finding of 
a valid privilege, the witness cannot be 
compelled to testify unless immunity is 
granted and the immunity is as broad as 
the privilege itself. 
At this point, the defense or the pros-
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to consider a hearing on the issue of 
prosecutoriaJ inununity. Since the terms 
of the statute require the request to be 
made by the prosecution, the actually 
request should be made by the prosecu-
tor and in writing. In a felony case, if the 
prosecu tion makes the motion, the court 
must set a time for the hearing and order 
the witnesses to show cause why the 
question should not be answered. The 
court must order the witness to answer 
the question unless the court finds that 
the witness could be subject to a criminal 
prosecution in another jurisdiction or 
that compelling the testlmony would be 
clearly contrary to the public interest . 
Upon complying with the court's order, 
the witness is immunized from prosecu-
tion based upon that testimony. 
If the prosecution does not make the 
motion, the defense can make a written 
motion requesting the court to order a 
hearing on the motion for immunity. At 
the hearing the defense must obtain the 
prosecution's approval of the immunity, 
or the court's determination that due 
process requires either immunity or a 
dismissal ofthe charges. United States v. 
Bautista (9th Cir. [Cal.j1975) 509 F. 2d 
675,677. 
In a misdemeanor case, if the witness 
makes an agreement in writing with the 
prosecuting attorney to testify in return 
for a grant of immunity, no hearing is 
required. Upon written request of the 
prosecuting attorney, the court must ap-
prove the agreement unless it finds that 
to do so would be clearly contrary to the 
public interest. If the immunity is ob-
tained, a motion for a protective order 
from the court is recommended, record-
ing the agreement, its terms,and the 
scope of the immunity. 
THE ePDA HOTLINE PANEL 
Attention: All Public Defenders 
From:CPDA 
Subject: Updated Hot Lines 
Computers: 
Michael Cantrall 916/ 362-5497 
Frank Cox 415/ 499-6321 
Al Menaster 213/974-3058 
Contempt: 
Albert Menaster 213/ 974-3058 
ConflictslEthics: 
Glen Mowrer 805/568-3470 
Stuart Rappaport 408/299-7700 
CPDA Amicus: 
Jack Funk 415/ 646-2481 
Gary Mandinach 213/ 243-0346 
Linda Robertson 415/495-0500 
John H. Scott 213/974-3050 
Defender Case Counseling: 
Stu Rappaport 408 / 299-7701 
Defender Case Counseling: 
Ken Clayman 805/654-2200 
Defender Case Counseling: 
Glen Mowrer 805/ 568-3470 
DiscoverylProp. 115 Issues: 
Tom Havlena 714/834-2144 
Grace Suarez 415/553-9305 
DNA: 
Walter F. Krstulja 213/ 974-2811 
Jeffrey E. Thoma 619/ 338-4880 
CPDA's Hotline numbers are listed 
below for use by defenders needing 
assistance in any of the areas listed. 
Topics: 
DUI: 
Ed Kuwatch 707/ 459-3999 
Bill Thornbury 310/ 458-5361 
Ethics: 
Glen Mowrer 805/568-3470 
Stuart Rappaport 408/ 299-7700 
Evidence: 
Albert Menaster 213 / 974-3058 
Forensics/Questioned Documents: 
Richard Fox 805/647-2021 
Jury Instructions: Trials &Al:peals 
Tom Lundy 707 545-3312 
Juvenile Delinquency: 
Sue Burrell 415/543-3379 
Juvenile Delinquency: 
Lisa M. Greer 213 / 974-3056 
Juvenile Dependency: 
Gary Seiser 619/ 495-5546 
Brad Bristow 916/441-3792 
Carmela Simoncini 619/696-0282 
Le~islation: 
Mi e Arleelian 916/ 440-6970 
Pretrial Motions: 
Grace Suarez 415/553-9305 
Priors: 
Michael Ogul 510/ 272-6600 
We would like to draw your 
attention to a couple of new sub-
ject areas: Jury Instructions and 
Priors. 
Parole Rev. and Post Conviction: 
Rowan Klein 213/ 447-7464 
Search & Seizure: 
Albert Menaster 213/974-3058 
Search & Seizure: 
Charles Denton 510/ 268-7411 
Sentencing: 
Charles Denton 510 / 268-7411 
Sentencing: 
Hank Hall 213/ 974-3066 
Speedy Trial: 
John H. Scott 213/ 974-3050 
"Three Strikes, You're Out": 
Al Menaster 213/ 974-3058 
Grace Suarez 415 / 553-9305 
Michael Ogul 510/ 272-6600 
Alex Ricciardulli 213/ 974-3067 
Jack A. Hochman 619/338-4670 
Training: 
Mark Arnold 916/ 666-8165 
Voir Dire: 
Michael McMahon 805/568-3489 
Writs: 
Al Menaster 213/ 974-3058 
John H . Scott 213 / 974-3050 
2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994 
